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Property Restitution Processes in Poland: 
Perspective of the Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
MAŁGORZATA ŚWIĘTCZAK 
Almost from the beginning of its activity of the Polish 
Commissioner for Human Rights, one of the key areas of interest for 
those holding the office has been the problem of restitution of property 
that was seized in post-war years for the purposes of reforms, which 
transformed the social and economic system in Poland.1 That issue gained 
particular importance after a political breakthrough in 1989 when 
democratization of public life had started and guarantees of respect for 
fundamental human rights as well as ownership rights were restored. 
At that point, hopes that it would be possible to achieve actual 
restitution of long-lost (nationalized) property were rising. The Office of 
the Commissioner, as the body safeguarding constitutional freedoms and 
rights, was inundated with complaints from citizens who were victims of 
post-war nationalization expecting their claims to be satisfied. At the 
same time, the Commissioner also received complaints from persons 
fearing the privatization of public property, who perceived it as a threat 
to their current and seemingly legitimately-obtained rights. Interventions 
of the Commissioner for Human Rights relating to such complaints 
referred to virtually all areas of property restitution. It is impossible to 
 
 Małgorzata Świętczak – Deputy Director of the Civil Law Department of the Office of the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, graduate of the University of Warsaw’s Faculty of Law and 
Administration which she completed with honours in 1997; in 1999–2004, PhD student in the 
Institute of Civil Law of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the Warsaw University; 
attorney-at-law (2002); LL.M. University of Ottawa (2003); internship at the law firm Furtek 
Palinka Zieliński and then KLegal Dobkowski i Wspólnicy (KPMG). Since 2004, lawyer in the 
Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, since 2005 Deputy Director of its Civil Law 
Department. Fields of expertise include: civil law and civil procedure, protection of ownership, real 
estate law, expropriation and property recovery, and property restitution.  
 1. See First Historic Address of the CHR, Jan. 27, 1988 (Jan. 27, 1988), referring to Dekret 
z dnia 26 października 1945 r. o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m. st. Warszawy 
[Decree of October 26, 1945 on the Ownership and Use of Land in the Area of the Capital City of 
Warsaw] (1945 Dz. U. no. 50 poz. 279, as amended) (Pol.). 
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indicate the number and subject matter of all the Commissioner’s 
interventions; they are described in detail in annual reports on the activity 
of the Commissioner for Human Rights.2 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY RESTITUTION IN POLAND, 
AND PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
The necessity to redress injustice suffered by former owners seemed 
obvious practically from the beginning of the political transformation 
process; it has never been challenged by any of the successive 
governments of the Republic of Poland. Yet, despite attempts of 
successive Parliaments of the III Republic of Poland aimed at passing an 
appropriate bill, the issue has not been resolved in a comprehensive and 
systematic way, and legislative work undertaken until this point has not 
produced any specific outcomes. The only groups of victims addressed 
by special legal acts are property owners from beyond the Bug river,3 as 
well as churches and religious associations. 
However, allowing matters to run their natural course did not 
automatically solve the “property restitution issue.” On the contrary, it 
seems that over time, problems arising from already initiated yet 
incomplete proceedings have become increasingly difficult to solve. In 
many situations, special provisions made it possible and still make it 
possible to carry out micro-scale restitution in individual cases, using a 
number of “systemically dispersed” legal instruments. Property seizures 
took place based on various instruments—sometimes pursuant to an act, 
individual administrative decisions, and court orders. Sometimes these 
were purely practical actions that lacked any legal basis. Yet, the chances 
for property restitution (or compensation) depended largely on the 
regulations under which one was deprived of his/her assets. As a result, 
only claims of small groups of victims can be satisfied, and the selection 
criteria of those groups seem to be random, selective, and by no means 
reasonably justified. Consequently, the process fails to meet the 
minimum criteria for the equal treatment of citizens by law. The end 
result of complicated proceedings is often uncertain and can be attributed 
to pure luck in many cases. 
Primarily, however, quasi-restitution was only possible when 
former property seizure also violated provisions that were in effect at that 
time. Yet, if the misappropriation of property was conducted within the 
then-applicable law—which is now considered as blatantly conflicting 
 
 2. See generally Informacje roczne o działalności RPO, RZECZNIK PRAW OBYWATELSKICH, 
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/informacje-roczne-o-dzialalnosci-rpo (last visited Feb. 4, 2018). 
 3. See Broniowski v. Poland, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 2. 
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with the fundamental principles of the democratic rule—former owners 
are not entitled to any compensation. Basing the property restitution 
procedures on the principle of responsibility for blatant abuse committed 
by former authorities—prima facie rational—paradoxically enough, 
leads to an almost schizophrenic effect: nowadays, we still try to ensure 
the execution of acts that stand in stark contradiction with the current 
constitutional order and whose axiology we reject, and the present-day 
society continues to pay for excesses of non-democratic authorities that 
ruled a couple of dozen years ago. 
When positive law treats such a complex matter in a selective and 
superficial manner, the whole burden for resolving complicated disputes 
concerning not only ownership relationships but also settlement and 
compensation is borne by citizens who are involved in years-long 
litigation, as well as by law enforcement bodies that need to deliver 
justice under the circumstances of shaken axiological order. As a result, 
the majority of fundamental principles pertaining to both the restitution 
of property as well as indemnification (compensation) developed in 
judicial rulings as well as in verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal, which 
are “less visible” for citizens, and in many cases with the involvement of 
the Commissioner for Human Rights who had either participated in cases 
resolved by decisions taken by extended judicial panels or had initiated 
legal proceedings. 
II. COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE BODY COMPETENT FOR 
PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION 
CASES 
A. Description of the Position of the Commissioner and His/Her 
Competencies 
All such problems were brought up in complaints submitted to the 
Commissioner. Complainants expected the Commissioner to take 
specific actions in defence of violated rights. Indeed, the specific position 
of the Commissioner who is placed beyond the traditional division of 
powers, as well as his/her relatively broad—yet not omnipotent—
competencies render the Commissioner an appropriate person to deal 
with such cases. 
The Polish Commissioner for Human Rights is a constitutionally-
appointed body which ensures compliance with the law, and protects 
human and civil rights and freedoms laid down in the Constitution as well 
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as other normative acts.4 The Polish Constitution in Article 80 stipulates 
that “pursuant to the principles laid down in the Act, everyone shall have 
the right to apply to the Commissioner for Human Rights for assistance 
in the protection of his/her freedoms or rights infringed by public 
authority bodies.”5 It is one of the means of safeguarding civil rights and 
freedoms. 
Pursuant to Article 210 of the Polish Constitution, “the 
Commissioner for Human Rights shall be, in his/her activities, 
independent of other State authorities and shall be accountable only to 
the Sejm, in accordance with principles laid down in the Act.”6 The scope 
and methods of the Commissioner’s work are specified in the Act of July 
15, 1987 on the Commissioner for Human Rights.7 In cases concerning 
the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, the basic duty of 
the Commissioner is to examine whether authorities, organizations or 
institutions that are required to respect and implement rights and 
freedoms violated the law or breached principles of social coexistence 
and justice either through an affirmative act or by failing to act. In this 
case, the Commissioner established that when human and civil rights and 
freedoms, (including the principle of equal treatment) are violated, he or 
she may operate with a relatively broad scope, as laid out in the Act.8 The 
Act differentiates between action taken in individual cases (Article 14), 
and action taken in general, system-related matters (Article 16).9 
In individual cases the Commissioner may, first and foremost, 
submit various interventions addressed to public authorities that, as he or 
she established, have violated the freedoms and rights of individuals and 
citizens. The Commissioner may also demand the instigation of 
proceedings in civil cases and participate in every ongoing procedure. 
The Commissioner holds the same powers in administrative proceedings; 
it may demand the instigation of proceedings, lodge complaints to an 
administrative court, and participate in the proceedings.10 The 
Commissioner is also entitled to submit cassation appeals to the Supreme 
 
 4. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Z DNIA 2 KWIETNIA 1997 
[CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND OF APRIL 2, 1997] art. 208 (1997 Dz. U. no. 78 poz. 
483, as amended) (Pol.). 
 5. See id. art. 80. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Ustawa z dnia 15 lipca 1987 r. o Rzeczniku Praw Obywatelskich [Act on the 
Commissioner for Human Rights of July 15, 1987] (2017 Dz. U. no. 958)(Pol.) 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. arts. 14, 16. 
 10. See id. In the Polish legal system administrative proceedings are divided into two 
instances, just like the proceedings before administrative courts that control the operation of public 
administration. 
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Court both in civil11 and criminal12 cases. Yet, for obvious reasons, a 
broad application of all those competencies is limited due to the statutory 
principle of subsidiarity of the Commissioner’s actions, as well as the 
organizational possibilities of the Office. 
The actual strength of the Commissioner’s activities is thus 
determined by his or her general rights. For example, in relation to 
examined cases, the Commissioner may, present to relevant authorities, 
organizations and institutions evaluations and conclusions aimed at 
securing effective protection of human and citizens’ rights and freedoms 
and facilitate the resolution of such cases. The Commissioner may also 
submit requests for the initiation of statutory initiatives (but does not have 
the initiative right as Commissioner) or for the issuance of amendment of 
other legal acts in cases concerning the freedoms and rights of individuals 
and citizens. The most powerful legal measure that the Commissioner for 
Human Rights can use is to submit motions (so-called abstract motions) 
to the Constitutional Tribunal, requesting it to determine the non-
compliance of lower-ranked normative acts with the Constitution. The 
Commissioner may also participate in proceedings held before the 
Tribunal which were initiated by other entities, for example, courts 
presenting legal queries or citizens presenting under the individual 
constitutional complaint procedure. The Commissioner is also entitled to 
present legal issues to the highest judiciary bodies—the Supreme Court 
and the Supreme Administrative Court—so that they, in extended 
compositions, may make decisions aimed at clarifying legal doubts that 
lead to discrepancies in verdicts of courts of law and administrative 
courts. Submitting such legal queries for examination is an important tool 
for standardizing the judicial practice. 
B. The Scope and Nature of Complaints Submitted to the 
Commissioner’s Office 
Due to the broad competencies of the Commissioner’s Office, he or 
she receives citizen complaints referring to virtually all fields of life. With 
respect to property restitution cases, persons who submit such complaints 
 
 11. Id. In light of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure cassation appeal is an 
extraordinary means for appealing against some final verdicts passed by second-instance courts, it 
also plays a public role: in order for it to be accepted by the Supreme Court for interpretation, the 
case must involve significant legal issues arousing interpretation doubts or a qualified breach of 
law. 
 12. See generally, 2017 Dz. U. no. 958 (what is typical of the Polish Commissioner is not the 
possibility to lodge a cassation appeal in criminal cases as such but a historically determined special 
privilege to challenge a final conviction to the benefit of a given party; the Commissioner may do 
that at any time). 
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are mainly: former owners of nationalized real estate or their heirs, who 
were deprived under several legal acts of their assets: land for the 
purposes of agricultural reform, and companies—under the industry 
nationalization process or under the procedure for placing them under 
public administration, pharmacies, pensions and small business entities. 
Complaints also pertain to property seized from churches and religious 
associations, nationalization of forests and lakes, compensation for those 
from beyond the Bug River, property claimed under the “Wisła” 
campaign,13 real estate seized when state borders were determined, 
settlement of the so-called Reclaimed Territories, Warsaw land, and 
deserted and post-German estates. 
The complaints submitted by that group of people pertain to the 
failure to satisfy their claims for the restitution of stolen property or at 
least for a compensation, which results from the lack of a general act on 
property restitution. In situations where the so-called micro-privatization 
is legally possible—by means of fragmentary regulations in some special 
provisions—complaints refer in principle to the duration and 
inconvenience caused by proceedings that are caused by both factual as 
well as stricte legal circumstances, for example, lack of documents 
destroyed during the war period, hindered access to archives, difficulties 
in contacting all possible heirs, and unclear provisions or changeable 
judicial decisions. 
However, former owners are not the only group sending complaints 
to the Commissioner for Human Rights. With this “bottom-up” property 
restitution possible and property can be returned in kind, current property 
owners or users of property previously seized by the state also approach 
the Commissioner with concerns about a possible loss of their rights, 
which they often obtained in good faith (but also, for instance, lessees of 
real estate who have invested in it for many years, in the hope of buying 
it on preferential terms).  Among the complainants is a special group: 
tenants of apartments in buildings that are still owned by the state or 
municipality, but who are affected by property restitution claims of 
former owners. These are usually individuals who, for various reasons—
financial, personal, livelihood or health-related—are not able to satisfy 
their residential needs on the free market. Public authorities are obliged 
to fulfill residential needs of their citizens, especially those in difficult 
situations. This obligation is clearly stated in Articles 75 and 76 of the 
 
 13. I.e., the military pacification and resettlement campaign that was conducted at the end 
1940s and directed at the civil population (of various nationalities) living in the south-eastern part 
of Poland. 
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Polish Constitution.14 One should also not overlook concerns voiced in 
the public discussion about excessive privatization of land that should be 
intended for public use, particularly to land in municipal areas returned 
on various grounds (parks, squares, recreational grounds), that serve 
inhabitants, as well as historic buildings. 
C. Main Problems from the Point of View of the Commissioner Office’s 
Practice 
The problem lying at the heart of most of those complaints is the 
lack of clear, predictable and understandable rules of conduct in property 
restitution cases. There are singular, fragmentary regulations allowing 
one to reclaim his or her property or to obtain relevant compensation. For 
example, it is possible in case an individual administrative decision to 
deprive somebody of assets was a gross violation of the then-applicable 
provisions, yet, such regulations are lacking in many cases. Sometimes 
legal loopholes may be filled by referring to general provisions, but in 
other cases it is not possible. Regulations are often inconsistent. Since 
specific legislation is missing, such cases rely on general legal constructs 
from the Code of Administrative Procedure (annulment of decisions), the 
Code of Civil Procedure (determination of legal status of real estate as of 
long-gone times) or from the Civil Code (liability for compensation, 
settlements between the owner and the person without legal title, etc.). 
Those provisions are not always relevant for resolving ‘historical’ cases. 
The grounds for making settlements, as well as their scope, are still highly 
disputable from a legal standpoint and they are a source of never-ending 
doctrinal disputes and discrepancies in verdicts. 
  What is of fundamental importance, however, is not the difficulties 
in applying the right methods of legal reasoning, but the deeply-rooted 
axiological chaos concerning the basis for resolving such conflicts of 
value. What is primarily missing is a clear declaration of the legislator on 
which claims are considered not only morally, but legally justified and to 
what amount. So far it has not been determined to what extent the 
community of citizens of the Polish state from the beginning of the 21st 
century is still liable for the historical injustice that authorities ruling 
many years ago committed (as well as for the acts of occupying powers 
and for the complete devastation of the country after the war). It should 
be remembered that those authorities lacked democratic legitimacy and 
were imposed by the geopolitical order established after World War II 
(“WWII”). That new order also resulted in shifting the Polish State’s 
 
 14. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ Z DNIA 2 KWIETNIA 1997, arts. 75, 76. 
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borders. Furthermore, the actions of post-war authorities brought 
injustice to other citizens through blatantly unfavourable reforms of the 
monetary system, nationalization of banks and deposits, political 
repressions, and forfeiture of property for example. 
Under such circumstances, the entire burden and responsibility for 
resolving hugely complicated historical and legal problems needs to be 
borne by law enforcement bodies, such as administrative authorities and 
administrative and common courts of law. It should be remembered that 
those bodies must in each case assess whether the property seizure was 
compliant with the legal status in place several dozen years ago when the 
social and economic situation, as well as an anachronic system of 
observance of the constitution were completely different. Therefore, it is 
not possible to avoid encountering unpredictable judicial decisions and 
differences in the way cases are resolved. Doubts do not only refer to the 
interpretation of historical provisions as such but also to which body—
after a number of significant public administration reforms—should run 
the proceedings in particular cases (a decision made by an incompetent 
body is burdened with a legal defect, which justifies the elimination of 
the verdict from the body of rulings). The issue concerning the mode, 
scope, and entities with which one could address claims for defective 
decisions from the past was resolved only several years ago by the 
Supreme Court. The decision was reached in the full composition of the 
Civil Chamber (several dozen judges),15 and explained how to interpret 
intricate time-related issues, resulting from numerous changes of law 
governing the disputed matter.16 
Thus, de facto, most solutions to property restitution problems are 
created by judgements, including resolutions passed in extended 
compositions of the highest courts to unify the interpretation of law. Yet, 
the elimination of discrepancies through resolutions of the Supreme 
Court and Supreme Administrative Court takes place after many years 
and may refer to only singular, fragmentary issues. Instability of judicial 
rulings primarily affects citizens themselves: even the unification of the 
interpretation of specific provisions - which, by nature, takes time - will 
not change the legal status of those individuals who have already 
definitely lost their cases as a result of applying another interpretation 
 
 15. See Ref. III CZP 112/10 (Mar. 31, 2011) (Pol.). 
 16. The lack of proper regulations in that scope was previously considered a violation of the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, drawn up 
on November 4, 1950 in Rome. See European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 6 § 1 [hereinafter Convention]; see 
also Plechanow v. Poland, 2009-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Sierpiński v. Poland, 2009-IV Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 
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that stands at the variance with the current standpoint of the judiciary. 
Failure to resolve the issue of property restitution by the legislator also 
leads to the fact that the law development in that field involves the highest 
cost possible—not only due to workload to the whole judicial sector, but 
also because of harm sustained by citizens who engage their own 
resources and efforts to arrive at the principles helping to resolve such 
cases. 
From the Commissioner for Human Rights’ perspective, the current 
status violates fundamental principles of a democratic rule of law, such 
as the principle of the certainty of law (legal security) and its 
predictability. It also runs counter to a significant constitutional value: 
citizens’ trust towards the state and its law. Those shortcomings result in 
a systemic breach of the principle of equal treatment of citizens before 
law, which in turn violates the principle of justice—the key value that the 
law should serve. 
Such complicated proceedings, in terms of evidence and legal 
aspects, by nature take numerous years. The need to initiate a specific 
sequence of procedures (inheritance-related, pertaining to administrative 
and legal issues as well as civil aspects) results, by default, in the violation 
of the constitutional right to have a case resolved in reasonable time. The 
European Court of Human Rights has on a number of occasions declared 
that Poland breached its Convention obligations because an excessively 
lengthy proceeding that lasts a dozen years or more is often a prominent 
feature in property restitution cases.17 Additionally, this reality creates 
uncertainty as to the legal status of disputed real estate (preventing 
possible investment) and overburdens the judicial system that needs to 
hear complicated, historical cases. This process generates additional 
social costs. 
III. EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTIONS MADE TO DATE BY THE 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
The 30 years of experience of the Commissioner’s Office makes it 
possible to identify certain general principles followed when examining 
cases related to the broadly understood issue of property restitution. 
Those principles may be presented in an order that corresponds to legal 
measures that the Commissioner has at its disposal. 
The ineffectiveness of the Commissioner’s numerous appeals to 
solve the property restitution issue by means of an act of Parliament made 
 
 17. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Article 6, sec. 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 
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the Commissioner’s role in this area that of an entity striving to “tidy up” 
the legal system—by way of presenting legal queries, submitting requests 
for interpretation of the law, and conducting information activities on the 
individual and general levels.18 From the very beginning, it was rightly 
assumed that the legal measure consisting in the so-called abstract 
verification of constitutionality of formerly binding laws would be 
ineffective. Even if such a request had been acknowledged and 
invalidated the challenged provisions, it would not solve all ownership-
related problems. The passage of time, subsequent trade in nationalized 
properties, and protection of rights obtained in good faith by third parties 
would make the Tribunal’s possible derogation fail to automatically 
eliminate legal effects that took place in the past. Such a view was also 
expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal in a precedential ruling 
concerning the decree on the agricultural reform.19 The problem of 
property restitution, therefore, still remains in the realm of economic and 
social policy. Yet, it could be solved by the legislative power, which has 
been legitimately empowered to make decisions of such a profound 
importance for the whole country. 
A. Review of the Constitutionality of the Nationalization Acts and 
Contemporary Legislation 
According to the Commissioner for Human Rights, attempts to 
challenge the overall constitutionality of nationalization acts that had 
consequences in the past are doomed to fail. Those acts were passed 
several dozen years ago and they resulted in the transformation of 
ownership relations in the country, including the acquisition of rights by 
third parties. Those effects already took place in the past. Yet, one cannot 
transfer ownership on this basis now, even though the acts may still 
formally be in force. In that sense, their nature is historical. A simple 
reversal of legal consequences and automatic restoration of the state from 
just after, or even before, WWII is not possible. 
That situation is further complicated by the fact that in some cases, 
as with the Warsaw land decree, the nationalization act was not only the 
basis for deprivation of property in the past but also for conducting 
present-day proceedings aimed at restitution of buildings that were 
 
 18. See COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., HANDBOOK OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
LOST PROPERTY, RESTITUTION, AND COMPENSATION (1992). 
 19. See Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z 6 września 1944 r. o 
przeprowadzeniu reformy rolnej. [Decree of the Committee for National Liberation of 6 September 
1944 Concerning the Agricultural Reform] (1944 Dz. U. no. 4 poz. 17, as amended) (Pol.); see also 
Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 5/01 of Nov. 28, 2001 (Pol.). 
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communalized or nationalized in 1940s or 1950s. Repealing the 
nationalization act may lead to further unpredictable and undesirable 
consequences in these cases, such as attempts to challenge the legitimacy 
of obtaining rights pursuant to those provisions. The ruling of the 
Constitutional Court from 2010 concerning agricultural reform also 
confirms that possible elimination of old provisions that constituted the 
basis for property relationship shifts should be treated with the utmost 
caution.20 Arguments presented in the justification of that ruling raised 
substantial doubt as to whether decisions passed on that basis—not only 
those depriving former owners of their rights, but also more favourable 
ones—such as allowing them to reclaim previously seized properties, 
were still valid or not. Owners’ uncertainty concerning the legal title they 
had was finally eliminated by subsequent resolutions of extended 
compositions of the Supreme Administrative Court,21 and the Supreme 
Court.22 These resolutions confirmed the legitimacy of the status quo. 
Nowadays, the legal status is different, as provisions applicable 
since 2017 make it impossible to submit the so-called abstract motion to 
the Constitutional Tribunal (among others, by the Commissioner for 
Human Rights) if a normative act loses effect before a ruling is passed; it 
is only possible under the individual constitutional complaint procedure 
initiated by the citizen.23 The Commissioner may not initiate the 
proceedings, yet it can join them. It is even more doubtful whether a 
possible attempt at “abolishing” a whole historical nationalization act 
would still be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Rulings (especially 
their justifications) concerning compensation for former owners of 
Warsaw land (cf. below) show that, according to the constitutional court, 
due to consequences for the whole legal system (social, economic and 
financial), such a decision should be only taken by the Parliament. 
 
 20. See Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 107/08, March 1, 2010 (Pol.) 
(concerning the annulment of proceedings: the Constitutional Tribunal refused to verify the 
constitutionality of executive provisions to the decree, claiming that since nowadays there are no 
instances of taking over land property, then not only legally substantive provisions but also 
procedural provisions de facto lost their binding effect). 
 21. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OPS 3/10, Jan. 10, 
2011 (Pol.). The Commissioner also participated in those proceedings defending the legitimacy of 
already passed rulings. In his opinion, to consider all of them invalid would blatantly affect the 
safety of transactions as well as rights of persons acting and showing trust towards final and legally-
binding resolutions. 
 22. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 121/10, Feb. 17, 2011 (Pol.); see also Sąd 
Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 21/11, May 18, 2011 (Pol.). 
 23. See Artykuł 59 ust. 1 ustawy z dnia 30 listopada 2016 r. O organizacji i trybie 
postępowania przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym [Act on the Organization and Mode of 
Proceedings Conducted Before the Constitutional Tribunal of November 30, 2016] art. 59(1) (2016 
Dz. U. nr. 30 poz. 2072) (Pol.). 
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Currently passed legal acts could surely still be subject to the 
assessment of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Commissioner for Human 
Rights was active in that regard. Yet, the limitations of this article do not 
allow one to list all of his or her activities. One example of an effective 
intervention was the challenging of legal solutions that significantly 
limited the scope of previously awarded claims concerning the so-called 
property from beyond the Bug River.24 Former owners considered the 
scope of the compensation problem for illegal acts by public bodies, and 
compensation for damages arising from those administrative decisions, 
which were passed in gross breach of legal provisions, extremely 
important. The provisions limiting that compensation to only the so-
called actual damage (i.e., excluding the so-called lost benefits) were 
deemed, at the request of the Commissioner, unconstitutional.25 The 
Commissioner also joined proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal 
initiated by individual citizens and supported their standpoints. Examples 
here are cases brought by former owners who managed to regain their old 
property. In those situations, where occupants residing in the returned 
building had a right to a council flat, and the commune failed to provide 
it on time, tenants could stay in their current place of residence on the 
same terms but the owner was entitled to compensation from the 
commune. The Commissioner challenged the limitation on the scope of 
that compensation and the Tribunal confirmed the unconstitutionality of 
such regulations.26 
In some cases, people are discouraged from submitting such 
motions because of the ineffectiveness of the Tribunal’s rulings. It mostly 
refers to those cases in which the Tribunal does not deem what the 
legislator stated in the disputed provision as unconstitutional, but rather 
it deems what is missing in a provision as unconstitutional (as an 
example, a given provision lacks information on what compensation 
rights a given citizen has). In the Polish legal system, Constitutional 
Court is considered a “negative legislator” since it can only eliminate a 
 
 24. See Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 33/02, Dec. 19, 2002 (Pol.). 
Prior to 2005, the claims of people resettled from beyond the eastern border of Poland could only 
be satisfied by the so-called right to consider the value of assets left behind and allow them to obtain 
national property for free or at a discount; yet exercising this right was in fact restricted due to small 
supply of such land and starting from 1994 it was practically impossible as agricultural property, 
constituting a significant restitution resource, was excluded from this possibility. see also Trybunal 
Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 33/02, Dec. 19, 2002 (Pol.) The decision passed by the 
Constitutional Tribunal challenged this solution and acknowledged the argument presented by the 
Commissioner that this way the constitutional principle of citizens’ trust towards the state and the 
law it creates is violated. 
 25. See Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 20/02, Sept. 23, 2003 (Pol.). 
 26. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 51/05, May 23, 2006 (Pol.). 
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specific norm from the law but it has no power to reformulate it or add a 
missing element to it. In such instances intervention of the legislator is 
required to bring about a real change in law. Therefore, in those property 
restitution cases where a possible acknowledgement of 
unconstitutionality would still require the passing of new provisions by 
the Parliament, possible submission of a motion is an ineffective measure. 
What can explicitly illustrate this situation is the problem of 
compensation for former owners of Warsaw land. Several rulings in 
which the Tribunal clearly stated the unconstitutionality of provisions 
limiting (or depriving people of) such compensation27 did not meet with 
any response from the legislator even though in justifications the Tribunal 
indicated the necessity to pass new laws constituting legal basis for the 
realization of compensation rights (the Tribunal’s ruling as such does not 
have such an effect).   
B. Unification of Judgments of Common and Administrative Courts 
For all of these reasons, the Commissioner for Human Rights 
decided that a more effective intervention measure was striving to unify 
fragmented court rulings by means of the so-called abstract legal queries 
addressed at both the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
Court. 
For illustrative purposes only, it is worth referring to the 
Commissioner’s request to decide whether a takeover of property by the 
State, without a legal basis but as part of public power (the so-called 
imperium), may lead to the acquisition by prescription—a method for 
acquiring subjective rights in private, civil law settings (called ownership 
within dominium). In that particular example, the Supreme Court 
prioritized the stabilization of legal relationships and claimed that, with 
some exceptions, prescription was possible.28 Other legal queries made 
by the Commissioner concerned the request to interpret provisions on 
state compensation responsibility towards citizens for failure to pass legal 
 
 27. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 41/09, June 13, 2011 (Pol.); 
see also Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 6/13, Oct. 28, 2015 (Pol.) (ruling 
passed in full composition of the judicial panel of 28 October 2015, ref. P 6/13); Trybunał 
Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], Kp 3/15, July 19, 2016 (Pol.) (ruling passed in full 
composition of the judicial panel of 19 July 2016, ref. Kp 3/15.) To justify the ruling SK 41/09, it 
was emphasized that its effect is not the loss of validity of provisions in which some regulations 
were omitted but pursuant to the Constitution that issue needs to be regulated: “the ruling, therefore, 
does not create any law-making consequences, consisting in the establishment of a new legal norm. 
It only obliges the legislator to pass legal regulations necessary for the realization of constitutional 
norms. Legislator’s intervention is also required to allow the complainants to exercise their rights.” 
 28. See Izba Cywilna Sądu Najwyższego [Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court], III CZP 
30/07, Oct. 26, 2007 (Pol.). 
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acts.29 The Commissioner also asked the Supreme Court whether the 
nationalization of waters at the beginning of 1960’s ceased the right of 
third parties to use lakes for economic purposes, when those rights were 
granted as late as in the middle of the XIX century.30 Similar interventions 
were also made before the Supreme Administrative Court in cases related 
to the decree on agricultural reform,31 among other things. Recently, he 
also presented a legal query concerning a case examined by the Supreme 
Court and related to claims for financial settlement for non-contract usage 
of buildings covered by the Warsaw decree, that is, settlements between 
those owners who managed to regain seized land (buildings) and the 
capital city of Warsaw.32 
C. Joining the Proceedings Conducted in Individual Cases 
It also happens that the Commissioner for Human Rights decides to 
intervene in individual cases of citizens. Such situations are truly 
exceptional. In his actions, the Commissioner follows the subsidiarity 
principle: parties in proceedings should independently use legal means 
they are entitled to. If the nature of the case requires it, they can use 
professional legal assistance at their own cost or at the cost of the state. 
Those in a difficult financial or personal situation may be assigned a 
court-appointed attorney. The Commissioner, in turn, usually decides to 
be formally involved in the proceedings when, for various reasons, the 
citizen is not able to use legal assistance and his/her special personal 
situation requires it. Additionally, the case must be of precedential nature 
and must offer the opportunity to shape judicial decisions in a particular 
field or solve a given problem affecting a bigger group of citizens. 
In recent years, the Commissioner for Human Rights decided to join 
court and administrative proceedings concerning property left behind the 
Bug river. The Commissioner also tried to encourage the adjudicating 
panels of the Supreme Administrative Court to assume a favourable 
interpretation of legal provisions on mutual representation of those 
entitled to compensation to respect a deadline for submitting relevant 
 
 29. It is an issue concerning responsibility for the so-called legislative omission – the problem 
affected, among other things, those nationalization acts in which former owners were granted 
compensation but it has never been paid out. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 139/08, 
May 19, 2009 (Pol.) (acknowledging such a responsibility, yet, only for the future, and eliminating 
the possibility of receiving compensation in this way for property nationalized years ago). 
 30. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 139/06, April 18, 2007 (Pol.). 
 31. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OPS 3/10, Jan. 10, 
2011 (Pol.). 
 32. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 84/16, April 19, 2017 (Pol.). 
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requests.33 Ultimately, that problem was resolved by the resolution of the 
Supreme Administrative Court.34 The Commissioner also participated in 
those proceedings. In several cases, the Commissioner lodged complaints 
to an administrative court concerning the lengthiness of proceedings, 
such as property restitution proceedings. Proceedings related to 
appropriate compensation for property left beyond the Bug river belong 
to one of the lengthiest and most notorious case extensions, constituting 
a systemic problem. This has also been noticed by the Court in 
Strasbourg, and was addressed by the Commissioner in numerous 
interventions to province governors and competent ministers, to no avail. 
Last year, the Commissioner for Human Rights also lodged a 
cassation complaint in a case related to the agricultural reform decree 
affecting a substantial area of two Warsaw suburbs communes where land 
estate was parcelled out for the purposes of the agricultural reform. 
Almost 1700 current inhabitants of those areas were parties in that case. 
According to the Commissioner, the content of the challenged verdict 
passed by the administrative court, which eliminated from legal status 
decisions taken more than 70 years ago (undoubtedly defective), may 
make those persons uncertain as to whether they legitimately acquired 
their property, even though that status should not be disputable. Yet, there 
is a concern that at least some of them, using their own resources and at 
their own cost, will have to seek confirmation of the current status quo. 
D. General Interventions Indicating the Need for Legislative Action 
Since it is obvious that solving property restitution problems is 
mostly possible through amendments of the currently applicable 
legislation, most activities undertaken by the Commissioner consisted of 
general interventions addressed either to competent ministers or to the 
President of the Council of Ministers. It is the government that, on the 
one hand, has the power to take the legislative initiative and, on the other 
hand, is the body which shapes the overall internal policy. Therefore, it 
has the power to lay down commonly binding procedures, applicable to 
all interested individuals, and is able to assess the costs of satisfying their 
claims. 
 
 33. The final deadline for submitting such a request (renewing it) was the end of 2008, but, 
not all entitled individuals respected it. See Ustawa z dnia 8 lipca 2005 r. o realizacji prawa do 
rekompensaty z tytułu pozostawienia nieruchomości poza obecnymi granicami Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej [The Act of July 8, 2005 on the Implementation of the Right to Compensation for Property 
Left Beyond the Present Borders of the Republic of Poland] (2015 Dz. U. nr. 169 poz.1418)(Pol.). 
 34. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OPS 3/17, Oct. 9, 
2017 (Pol.). 
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Since the Commissioner was aware of challenges associated with 
enacting a uniform, universal property restitution law, the Commissioner 
also made attempts to bring about changes to the law in fragmentary 
cases. They related to diverse issues, such as the need to grant 
compensation to former owners of Warsaw land,35 lengthy property 
restitution proceedings conducted before administrative bodies (mainly 
in the so-called Bug river cases, but also agricultural reform), and a legal 
basis which should be adopted for granting possible compensation for 
former forest owners. A number of interventions related to the need to 
perform the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal including the 
abovementioned rulings on compensations for the owners of Warsaw 
land, and also the method for challenging rulings on the restitution of 
property taken from churches and religious associations passed by special 
national-church committees, called regulatory committees. 
What has a special place in that context, is the issue of executing the 
verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal of 2015, in case P 46/13,36  and—
for obvious reasons—the problem of enacting a universal property 
restitution law. Those issues will be discussed in the last part of this 
article. 
IV. CURRENT INITIATIVES OF THE COMMISSIONER, AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
SOLVING THE EXISTING PROBLEMS 
A. The Need to Pass the So-called Comprehensive Property Restitution 
Act – Correspondence with the Presidents of the Council of Ministers 
(case no. IV.7004.9.2016) 
Recently, the most important activity of the Commissioner has been 
corresponding with subsequent heads of the government. This 
correspondence included comprehensive, systemic interventions 
addressed to subsequent Presidents of the Council of Ministers, 
requesting them to prepare a general property restitution act and, 
ultimately, solve the problems arising from unfinished property 
restitution processes.37 In those cross-sectional interventions, the 
 
 35. See Intervention Addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers, RPO-706023/12, 
Oct. 23, 2012 (Pol.) (stating that the method of seizing that land was so specific that this group 
needed to be treated separately). 
 36. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 46/13, May 12, 2015 (Pol.). 
 37. See, e.g., Intervention Addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers, RPO-
706023/12, Oct. 23, 2012 (Pol.); Intervention Addressed to the President of the Council of 
Ministers, IV.7004.9.2016, Oct. 7, 2016 (Pol.); Interventions to Further Government Members 
Responsible for the Direction of Strategic Legislative Work, IV.7004.9.2016, May 9, 2017 and Oct. 
2, 2017 (Pol.). 
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Commissioner indicated some areas of legislators’ neglect and the 
resulting breaches of citizens’ rights. 
The Commissioner for Human Rights once again pinpointed such 
negative phenomena as follows: the unfair treatment of particular citizen 
groups (out of which only some members may regain their assets, in 
varying degree); creating possibilities for various types of abuse; the lack 
of sufficient protection for tenants living in tenement houses undergoing 
property restitution; and shifting the responsibility of solving all 
complicated problems onto public enforcers, such as public 
administration and the judicial system. With reference to a commonly 
mentioned argument about limited budgetary resources, he observed that 
it could be the reason why compensations, however modest they are, 
should be awarded according to transparent and just principles. What is 
of key importance is, primarily to ensure that all citizens are treated 
equally, and then to establish transparent procedural rules for granting 
compensations with principles that are predictable to all interested 
parties. 
In these interventions, the Commissioner criticized a legislator who, 
in property restitution cases, had almost fully withdrawn from his role as 
regulator of social relationships. Moreover, this abdication had occurred 
in an area that arouses strong emotions in the society, involves serious 
financial costs and, primarily, is an area in which unresolved disputes 
lead to real tragedies of people. “The whole burden and cost of 
conducting property restitution proceedings, which are now and will still 
be pending in the future, has been shifted by the legislator to the judicial 
system and ultimately also to former owners and their successors. They 
are burdened with the task of seeking, by way of trial and error, those 
mechanisms in the legal system that would allow them to have their 
legitimate rights satisfied.”38 
Responses received so far do not harbour much hope for the passing 
of such an act in the foreseeable future. The direction of legislative work 
in the State Treasury Department and then in the Finance Ministry was 
awaiting the final approval of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, a draft 
act prepared by the Ministry of Justice and discussed in section 4 seemed 
to be such a significant breakthrough. 
  
 
 38. See Intervention Addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers, RPO-706023/12 
at 6. 
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B. The Institution of Annulment of Administrative Decisions: Time 
Framework and Compensation for a Defective Decision (case no. 
IV.7004.45.2015) 
Irrespective of the so-called comprehensive property restitution 
act—whose passing encounters obvious difficulties—what plays a huge 
role in property restitution cases is the precedential ruling of the 
Constitutional Tribunal in the case no. P 46/13. According to this ruling, 
what is unconstitutional is the provision that makes it possible to annul 
an administrative decision—even if it blatantly violates the law—without 
any time restrictions, and even when, based on that decision, third parties 
already made life arrangements trusting that the status confirmed by the 
decision was legitimate. This ruling is crucial for property restitution 
cases since the provision which was partially deemed unconstitutional 
constitutes the basic quasi-restitution mechanism, making it possible to 
reverse the consequences of illegal property seizures (or possibly obtain 
relevant compensation). Yet, due to specific wording of the operative part 
of the Tribunal’s ruling, it does not bring direct effect. This fact means 
that it does not repeal the disputed provision; once again, a legislator’s 
intervention is required to implement that ruling within the legal system. 
The Commissioner for Human Rights intervened in that case too. 
Unfortunately, despite several interventions addressed to the competent 
minister (as well as the Speaker of the Senate),39 and initial declarations 
concerning plans to amend the questionable provisions, so far, there has 
not been any change. In October 2016, the Senate also abandoned 
legislative work on the implementation of the abovementioned ruling of 
the Constitutional Tribunal. What can be noticed, however, is the way the 
ruling has affected verdicts passed by administrative courts. Among other 
things, one can observe more restraint in establishing a blatant violation 
of law by decisions from many years ago. Nevertheless, individual 
statements of judicature do not set precedence in the Polish legal system. 




 39. See Wystąpienia do Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji [Interventions to the 
Minister of Interior and Administration], IV.7004.45.2015, Jan 7, 2016, April 28, 2017 and Sept. 
25, 2017 (Pol.). Wystąpienie do Marszałka Senatu [Intervention to the Speaker of the Senate] 
IV.7004.9.2016, Oct. 7, 2016. 
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C. The Problem of So-called Warsaw land, and the Appointment of the 
Special Verification Commission (case no. IV.7004.5.2017) 
The legal problems presented above surely facilitated abuse, 
especially in those cases where land that could be reclaimed was 
extremely valuable. Media reported cases of extortionate rulings by 
means of fictitious documents and instances of the so-called “tenement 
houses purges” tormenting tenants living in returned council buildings, 
forcing them to move so that subsequently renovated apartments could 
be rented on a commercial basis. In order to fight with such instances of 
abuse, in 2017,40 a special Verification Commission was established. The 
Sejm appointed this body according to a political tenet: to perform the 
function of an administrative institution equipped with special 
competencies and to rule, in many cases, following the principles of 
equity. The Commission may, for example, repeal legally binding 
decisions concerning the restitution of buildings to their pre-war owners 
if it establishes irregularities in the process of granting such a decision 
many years back. Decisions can also be repealed if the Commission 
determines that a private owner acted in breach of the law after 
reclamation of a building, or even if such breaches were committed by its 
subsequent owner. What is even more contentious is the possibility to 
annul the decision (even the one approved by the court) in case the 
Commission deems it contrary to the public interest. 
Controversies surrounding the appointment of the Commission, as 
well as its operation, were discussed in interventions of the 
Commissioner for Human Rights addressed to the President of the 
Republic of Poland, among other officials.41 In a separate intervention,42 
the Commissioner brought the need to maintain constitutional and 
convention-related standards for interrogating people summoned for 
Commission’s hearings to the attention of the Commission’s President. 
The Commissioner also asked him to clarify how that body applied some 
legal provisions (the act comprises a number of the so-called general 
clauses as well as evaluative, unclearly defined concepts, whose 
unambiguous interpretation is required to respect the rights of 
participants of such procedures). 
 
 40. See Ustawa o szczególnych zasadach usuwania skutków prawnych decyzji 
reprywatyzacyjnych dotyczących nieruchomości warszawskich, wydanych z naruszeniem prawa 
[Act of March 9, 2017 on Special Principles for Removing Legal Consequences of Property 
Restitution Decision Affecting Warsaw Real Estate, which Were Taken in Breach of Legal 
Provisions] (2017 Dz. U. 718, as amended (Pol.)). 
 41. See Intervention of the Commissioner, IV. 7004.5. 2017, Mar. 16, 2017 (Pol.). 
 42. See Intervention of the Commissioner, Sept. 29, 2017 (Pol.). 
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D. Draft of the So-called Comprehensive Property Restitution Act, 
Dated October 2017 
Against the background of previous deliberations, one can truly 
appreciate the ground-breaking significance of the recent initiative to 
finally resolve problems in that area. The draft act, prepared by the 
Ministry of Justice, strives to “redress some injustice that individuals 
suffered after communist authorities seized real estate or moveable 
property after 1944.”43 The draft act aims to regulate all issues related to 
post-war nationalizations. It also strives to regulate the legal status of real 
estate and partially satisfy resulting claims. As of Spring 2018, however, 
it is difficult to say whether, and in what shape, the proposed draft will 
become applicable law. It was assumed, though, that the said act would  
enter into force on 1 January 2018. Yet, the draft has been recently 
withdrawn back to the Ministry to be reshaped and rewritten. What sparks 
most doubts and questions is primarily the financial safeguarding of the 
act’s implementation, which depends on the state of the budget 
(incidentally, it has always been presented as an argument preventing 
property restitution acts from being passed). The final shape of the 
proposed solution depends primarily on the decision of the Parliament of 
the Republic of Poland. 
The draft of the act, in its 26 October 2017 version, only provides 
for the satisfaction of property restitution claims in the form of 
compensation, and it only applies to properties taken over based on an 
enumerated list of nationalization acts. What is completely excluded are 
returns in kind. The only exception that may apply is the regulation of the 
legal status of land in Warsaw for those individuals who have 
continuously resided there for many years. Compensations will be 
awarded in one of three forms: the so-called right of recognition (i.e., 
recognizing the value of the right and taking it into account when 
assessing the sale price of national or local real estate or the fee for 
converting perpetual usufruct into property ownership), the financial 
compensation paid from the special Compensation Fund, or treasury 
bonds. The amount of these compensations is limited to 20% of the value 
of seized property and, in the case of bonds, 25% of that value. The draft 
of the act precisely specifies the method for calculating the value of 
seized property and indicates, among other things, that its status should 
 
 43. See Projekt ustawy o zrekompensowaniu niektorych krzywd wyrzadzonych osobom 
fizycznym wskutek przejecia nieruchomosci lub zabytkow ruchomych przez wladze 
komunistyczne po 1944 r. [To Compensate for Some of the Harm Done to Natural Persons as a 
Result of the Acquisition of Real Estate or Movable Monuments by the Communist Authorities 
After 1944], draft dated Oct. 26, 2017 (Pol.). 
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be assessed at the date of seizure and with the consideration of all burdens 
existing at that time. The draft also provides for the necessity of 
presenting possible claims in a uniform, yearly period, from the entry of 
the act to its enforcement. After that period, claims shall expire. All 
compensation proceedings are supposed to be unified. Province 
governors will be competent authorities in those matters. Therefore, all 
restitution proceedings that are conducted currently in administrative or 
judicial procedures with respect to the restitution of property or 
compensation will be cancelled. 
Compensation will be granted only to natural persons who are 
Polish citizens. It will not be granted to all those persons who managed 
to get any compensation (or return in kind) for the seizure of property 
pursuant to nationalization acts. According to the Act, those individuals 
would be the citizens of all countries with whom the so-called 
indemnification agreements were concluded, American or Canadian 
citizens for example,44 irrespective of whether appropriate compensation 
was paid to them by the governments of their countries.45 The 
compensation can only be offered to former owners or heirs from their 
closest families: descendants, spouses, parents. The Act even excludes 
siblings from the group entitled to compensation. Additionally, the Act 
eliminates the possibility of compensation for  individuals beyond that 
narrow included group, who obtained property restitution claims from 
those who were primarily entitled under various agreements. 
It is not entirely clear what would be the ground for granting 
compensation. On the one hand, although all those deprived of property 
pursuant to provisions specified in the Act were supposed to be entitled 
to it, the Act comprises a number of substantive exclusions listing the 
reasons for refusing compensation. On the other hand, Article 12 of the 
draft clearly states that the right to compensation should be granted for 
such real estate that was taken over by the State Treasury or another legal 
person under public law, in blatant violation of the law or without legal 
 
 44. See Agreement Between the Polish People’s Republic and the Government of Canada 
Concerning Financial Settlements (Oct. 15, 1971); see also Agreement Between the United States 
of America and the Government of the Polish People’s Republic Concerning Claims Pursued by 
the Citizens of the United States (July 16, 1960). 
 45. Indemnification agreements were concluded as part of economic agreements between the 
government of the Polish People’s Republic and the governments of a dozen or so countries; apart 
from the US and Canada such countries included: France, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Greece and Austria. Those agreements have never been formally published in Poland 
as binding legal acts - preferential treatment of foreign nationals compared to Polish citizens who 
never received any compensations for deprived estates seemed to be one of the reasons for the lack 
of publication of those acts. 
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grounds. Therefore, a person applying for such compensation needs to 
submit, among several other required documents, a declaration stating 
that the property was taken over under such circumstances. 
Making the decision to grant compensation dependent on whether 
the estate was taken over in compliance or in violation of nationalization 
provisions would change the whole philosophy of planned “property 
restitution” in an evident way. First, the planned mechanism has very 
little to do with eliminating the restitution of property in kind. By 
principle, it does not strive to reverse, even partially, changes in 
ownership relationships (in those cases when, after many years, it is still 
possible). Second, its aim is to, in accordance with the name of the act, 
partially redress some damage done by previous authorities who failed to 
observe their own principles when depriving others of their property. The 
draft initiator consistently avoids the term “damages” and treats the 
awarded benefit as granted ex gratia. For those reasons, it seems unlikely 
that it will be possible to obtain compensation for the majority of estates 
seized in the 1940s and 1950s, as long as the nationalization happened 
under the legal order in place at that time. If it is so indeed, drafted 
provisions do not extend the legal basis for property restitution processes 
in comparison with the current state. Yet, they significantly limit property 
rights of former owners as well as their legal successors by introducing 
the criterion of citizenship, excluding the possibility of returning property 
in kind, and providing legal restrictions concerning the value of the right 
to which one is entitled. 
The unquestionable advantage of the proposed solutions is placing 
dispersed property restitution processes into consistent frameworks that, 
as should be specifically emphasized, are equal for everyone (although, 
in fact, to the limited number of those actually entitled). Such a solution 
requires a compromise that can be reached by, among other things, 
limiting present-day rights. It is not possible to ensure a claim satisfaction 
level that would allow individuals to have their property fully returned in 
kind as well as grant financial compensation. Capping the amount of 
compensations is, by principle (subject to possible exceptions), consistent 
with both the Polish Constitution (as long as its scale is rightly justified) 
as well as the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights. 
On numerous occasions, the European Court of Human Rights 
examined complaints from former owners of property that had been 
nationalized in subsequent post-war political transformations in Central 
and Eastern Europe.46 In such cases, however, it consistently reasserted 
 
 46. Those cases were heard in the context of an alleged breach of Article 6, sec. 1 of the 
Convention (the right to fair and public examination of a case in a reasonable period by an 
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that, in its view, Article 1 to Protocol No. 1 to the Convention does not 
guarantee the acquisition of the right nor does it impose any restrictions 
on countries with respect to establishing the category of property subject 
to restitution (here, countries, signatories of the Convention, differ 
significantly) or conditions for restitution in kind. What is really 
important is whether legal provisions in that matter are clear and 
predictable for its addressees and whether such an interference with the 
convention law (here: ownership right) is legally justified and well 
grounded. The principle of fair balance between the interests of an 
individual and the measures applied to realize a publicly useful goal is a 
key criterion for assessing the admissibility of such an intervention. 
In a way, those principles relate to the problem of property 
restitution as such. The Court in Strasbourg stated on numerous occasions 
that—especially in the period of serious political, social, and economic 
transformations—it is not possible to guarantee immediate and full 
satisfaction of people’s justified claims. On the contrary, as decisions 
concerning adopted property restitution principles are, by principle, 
political in nature, national authorities must always evaluate the pros and 
cons stemming from undertaken actions to find a balance between the 
need to satisfy various claims and conflicting interests. In that category 
of issues, they can enjoy substantial independence. Yet, that 
independence is not unlimited, and any restriction on the realization of 
formerly acquired rights must be particularly justified with the need to 
realize other values significant for the society (including the need to 
ensure necessary support to other “socially disadvantaged” groups) that 
could not be achieved in any other way. One of the mentioned, and 
possibly justified, mechanisms for limiting restitution (compensation), is 
the reduction of the amount of granted money or possibly paying those 
amounts in installments. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention 
does not guarantee the right to compensation in the full amount or in 
every possible situation. 
Nowadays, the most controversial issue seems to be linking the right 
to compensation with one’s citizenship. That mechanism was adopted 
from the so-called Bug River Act of 2005.47 In those cases, the allocation 
of compensation was approved only to Polish citizens by the Polish 
 
independent and objective court) and from the point of view of conformance with Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (the right to respect ownership and freedom from unjustified 
interference of authorities). See Convention, art. 6, sec. 1, art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Covention. 
See Atanasiu v. Romania, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:1012JUD003076705 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 12, 
2010), for an example of a case  covered by the pilot ruling procedure. 
 47. See 2015 Dz. U. nr. 169 poz.1418. 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2018  6:21 PM 
526 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
Constitutional Tribunal.48 Also, the European Court of Human Rights 
acknowledged that, in principle, the Republic of Poland fulfillled 
obligations resting on the country in an appropriate manner by adopting 
the Act of 2005 in that shape. Yet, it should be emphasized that, in case 
of people living beyond the Bug River, the criterion of citizenship was 
the reason for their resettlement from the so-called Polish eastern frontier 
(and deprivation of property). Mass repatriation referred to when Poles 
and Jews, citizens of the Soviet Union of Lithuanian, Belarusian or 
Ukrainian nationality, were resettled in reverse direction. Unlike that 
extraordinary situation, post-war nationalizations that took place on the 
territory of Poland affected all owners equally, irrespective of their origin 
or nationality. Therefore, this regulation would also require exceptionally 
careful examination of its conformance with the EU principle of equal 
treatment of all citizens of the European Community. 
It also seems that citizens of countries with which indemnification 
agreements were concluded should be dealt with separately. It is indeed 
the case that a specific amount of resources were allocated for the 
satisfaction of their claims, as opposed to the claims of Polish citizens 
(yet, the actual fulfillment of those obligations is a different matter). If 
the current compensation benefits are to be granted ex gratia in a 
significantly limited amount and will not be addressed to all entitled 
individuals, it seems that in those cases, after considering all 
circumstances, it would be more difficult to claim that victims were not 
treated equally and that the rules of social justice were violated. 
Surely, those whose situation deteriorates, that is, those who will 
possibly be deprived of satisfying their claims in the present form, will 
have reservations regarding the Act. The allegation concerning the 
violation of their property rights as well as the principle of protection of 
acquired rights, or even pending interests, that is derived from the rule of 
law clause in the Constitution should be, however, confronted with the 
objectives of the act: the final resolution of problems resulting from 
unfinished property restitution processes, elimination of legal chaos, 
uncertainties surrounding the legal status of lands and, primarily, the 
unequal treatment of citizens. An inevitable consequence of a 
 
 48. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], K 2/04, Dec. 15, 2015, (Pol.). The 
Tribunal was supposed to assess separately whether limiting the Bug River compensation only to 
Polish citizens should apply not only to former owners but also their heirs. Compare Trybunał 
Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 1/17, Dec. 19, 2017, (Pol.) in which the 
Commissioner is also participating. The decision of Dec 19, 2017 confirms this particular 
compensation is of social nature and therefore the constitutional guarantees referring to ownership 
and inheritance do not apply to Bug-River cases. Hence, the citizenship-related exclusion clause is 
in accordace with the Polish Constitution. 
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comprehensive transformation of restitution processes in order to 
maintain the principle of equality in claims satisfaction is the deprivation 
of some rights from those individuals who were in a relatively better 
situation than the rest of victims. Redressing all forms of injustice in full 
is, namely, unrealistic. It is also difficult to find a stricte legal basis in 
either the Polish Constitution or the European Convention to pursue such 
demands that would be enforceable. One should not fail to observe that 
new provisions improve the legal situation of some entitled individuals, 
in particular former owners of Warsaw land, by offering them the 
possibility to obtain compensation but also allowing them, in some cases, 
to favourably regulate the legal status of owned real estate. 
In conclusion, the fundamental issue of whether the balance 
between the protection of private interests and public interests in the 
drafted provisions has been maintained will surely be the subject of 
numerous discussions. The confrontation of legal, political, historical and 
economic arguments should be expected in the course of this debate. In 
fact, it all comes down to the question of how, in those extremely complex 
cases, we should strive to implement the principle of justice: to return 
what needs to be rightfully returned to people, without bringing injustice 
to others. The debate is likely to end before either the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal or the European Court of Human Rights. In any 
case, what should be considered a breakthrough is the fact that after so 
many years that debate finally has been initiated. Its course will be closely 
monitored by the Commissioner for Human Rights as well. 
 
